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I. INTRODUCTION: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
OF CHARITABLE GIVING
In 2010, the news media commended billionaires Bill Gates and
Warren Buffet when they signed the “Giving Pledge,” an appeal for the
super-rich to donate at least half of their wealth to charity before or at
death.1 This phenomenon is hardly new – many of the nation’s most
affluent donate large portions of their wealth to charity rather than
leave a mountain of wealth for their families.2 One of the more famous
donors was also one of America’s first super-rich, Andrew Carnegie,
whose legacy continues today through the charitable work of the Carnegie Foundation.3
Individuals give during life or at death in part to help others, in part
to gain “prestige” or immortality, and in part because the government
incentivizes charitable giving with tax exemptions that incentivize giving.4 In 1995, according to the IRS, decedents with estates worth more
than twenty million dollars bequeathed over twenty percent of their estates to charity, and bequests accounted for roughly seven percent of all
charitable giving – a total of nearly $150 billion.5 The law affords
wealthy donors a taste of immortality by enforcing the conditions placed
upon a charitable gift for theoretical eternity, immune from normal statutory restrictions and the Rule of Perpetuities.6
1 See, e.g., Shelly Banjo & Robert A. Guth, U.S. Super Rich to Share Wealth, WALL
ST. J., (Aug. 3, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405274870
4017904575409193790337162.
2 See Anderson Antunes, The 30 Most Generous Celebrities, FORBES, (Jan. 11, 2012,
8:03 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andersonantunes/2012/01/11/the-30-most-generous-celebrities/.
3 See Andrew Carnegie: Pioneer. Visionary. Innovator., CARNEGIE CORP. OF N.Y.,
http://carnegie.org/about-us/foundation-history/about-andrew-carnegie/ (last visited Sept.
15, 2015).
4 See I.R.C. § 2055(a)(1)-(5) (authorizing bequests to the public, charity, or religious institutions to be deducted from “the value of the taxable estate”) (emphasis added);
William T. Harbaugh et al., Neural Responses to Taxation and Voluntary Giving Reveal
Motives for Charitable Donations, 316 SCI. MAG. 1622, 1624 (June 15, 2007) (discussing
that studies on donor control “suggest that both pure altruism and warm glow are important motives for charitable giving.”).
5 See Martha Britton Eller, Charitable Bequests: Evidence from Federal Estate Tax
Returns, STAT. OF INCOME BULL., Spring 2001 at 174, 182, 188.
6 See Rob Atkinson, Reforming Cy Pres Reform, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1114-15
(1993).
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The public greatly benefits from charitable gifts, which help to fund
public libraries, parks, museums, churches, universities, poverty relief,
and support for existing charitable organizations.7 To further encourage
charitable giving, the law gives donors the right to specify – as precisely
as they like – how bequeathed funds are to be disbursed over time.8
This “quid pro quo”9 for charitable giving may gratify donors in the present but often proves burdensome in due course because society can
evolve in unpredictable ways by the time the gift takes effect.10 As time
passes, restrictions on charitable bequests can become increasingly inefficient to the point where fidelity to the “dead hand” ceases to be rational.11 In response, English courts of equity developed the doctrine of
cy pres comme possible (“cy pres”), French for “as near as possible,”
which enables courts to modify the purposes of charitable trusts when
the attorney general, trustee, or other “interested parties” prove the
trust’s purpose to be impossible or impracticable.12
Under traditional rules, a party seeking to invoke cy pres must
prove three elements: (1) impossibility or impracticability of purpose,
(2) that the trust advances an actual charitable purpose, and (3) that the
donor possessed general (rather than specific) charitable intent.13 General donor intent requires the court to find a general preference on the
donor’s part to continue the trust under revised terms if and when the
original purpose becomes obsolete.14 If the moving party can show all
7 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 (2003) (listing legitimate charitable purposes).
8 See Atkinson, supra note 6, at 1114; see generally Evelyn Brody, From the Dead
Hand to the Living Dead: The Conundrum of Charitable-Donor Standing, 41 GA. L. REV.
1183 (2007) (discussing charitable donors’ standing to enforce restrictions on their gifts).
9 See Atkinson, supra note 6, at 1114.
10 The psychology of giving is a major point of research in many academic fields
including economics, cognitive science, and legal policy. See, e.g., Adam Hirsch, Freedom
of Testation/Freedom of Contract, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2180, 2187 (2011) (“Gratuitous transfers obviously benefit recipients, but they simultaneously gratify a benefactor, whose happiness depends on theirs (given an interdependent utility function in the icy jargon of
economics)–a Pareto optimal gain from transfer, as opposed to trade.”); Sara Helms et
al., New Evidence on Charitable Gift Restrictions and Donor Behaviour, 20 APPLIED
ECON. LETTERS 1521, 1521 (2013) (Finding that “allowing [donors] the option to limit a
charitable gift increases the average gift size whether or not the donor chooses to exercise
that option.”).
11 See Hirsch, supra note 10, at 2240 (“At some point, the marginal benefit to the
testator of continued control must equal the marginal cost to the restriction.”).
12 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. a; see generally Alberto, B. Lopez, A Revaluation of Cy Pres Redux, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1307 (2010) (providing a detailed history of the doctrine from its English roots to the Uniform Trust Code’s
modifications).
13 See Lopez, supra note 12, at 1309-10.
14 See id. at 1310.
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three elements, the court can invoke cy pres to modify the trust in line
with the settlor’s general charitable intent.15 If the trustee fails to prove
general charitable intent, the trust fails and the funds revert to the settlor (if living) or, more commonly, the settlor’s estate.16
Because trust documents usually do not speak directly to the matter, the issue of whether a settlor possessed general charitable intent can
give rise to litigation.17 Beneficiaries and other interested parties have
standing to challenge the presence of the settlor’s general charitable intent and often opt to do so because, if a challenge is successful and the
trust fails, the funds are returned to the decedent’s estate.18 The Uniform Trust Code (UTC), currently enacted by thirty states and the District of Columbia,19 creates a rebuttable presumption of general
charitable intent when trustees move for cy pres modification,20 with the
apparent aim of discouraging litigation over the issue. In the jurisdictions that adopted the UTC, courts no longer have to decipher testimony about the history of a gift to support the claim of the settlor’s
general charitable intent, which makes the gift less likely to fail for lack
thereof.
Nonetheless, if a court finds that cy pres applies, it will still hear
evidence to determine whether the proposed modification to trust instrument mirrors the donor’s subjective intent.21 Representatives of alternative interests continue to have reason to challenge proposed
changes, and costly disputes over how to redirect funds often ensue.22
15

See id.
See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413 cmt. (2010) (“[Section 413] modifies the doctrine of
cy pres by presuming that the settlor had a general charitable intent . . . . Traditional
doctrine did not supply that presumption, leaving it to the courts to determine whether
the settlor had a general charitable intent. If such intent is found, the trust property is
applied to other charitable purposes. If not, the charitable trust fails.”).
17 See Wendy A. Lee, Charitable Foundations and the Argument for Efficiency: Balancing Donor Intent with Practicable Solutions Through Expanded Use of Cy Pres, 34
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 173, 184-85 (2000).
18 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 94(2) (2012) (“A suit for the enforcement of a charitable trust may be maintained only by the Attorney General . . . or by
another person who has a special interest in the enforcement of the trust.”); Lopez, supra
note 12, at 1350 (“Some courts request that interested parties submit proposals to aid in
the decisionmaking process.”).
19 Legislative Fact Sheet – Trust Code, UNIF. L. COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws
.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Trust%20Code (last visited Sept. 15, 2015).
20 See Unif. Trust Code § 413 cmt.
21 See id. § 413(a)(3) (“the court may apply cy pres to modify . . . the trust . . . in a
manner consistent with the settlor’s charitable purposes”).
22 See, e.g., In re Fisk Univ., 392 S.W.3d 582 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011); In re Elizabeth
J.K.L. Lucas Charitable Gift, 261 P.3d 800 (Haw. Ct. App. 2011); see generally Iris J.
Goodwin, Ask Not What Your Charity Can Do for You: Robertson v. Princeton Provides
Liberal-Democratic Insights into the Dilemma of Cy Pres Reform, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 75, 75
16
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This article argues that state legislatures should expand the UTC’s
approach to cy pres and authorize courts to alter a qualifying charitable
trust under a “reasonable donor” standard to eliminate speculation
about whether the particular modification directly aligns to the donor’s
original intent. Under this approach, when a charitable purpose becomes outmoded, and the instrument is silent on the issue, the public—
rather than the settlor’s distant heirs—remains the sole beneficiary of
the trust fund. . Allowing courts to apply a reasonable donor standard
will not deter giving because the law already ensures a trustee’s fidelity
to the donor’s specific intent by requiring proof of impracticability or
impossibility before altering the purpose of the trust under cy pres.23
Thus, when courts determine the appropriate remedy upon a finding of
impracticality, they should abandon the search for the settlor’s implicit
preferences concerning trust modification – preferences that are no less
opaque than the presence or absence of general charitable intent – and
instead impose a reasonable modification that balances the charities’
needs, the potential public benefit from the proposed change, and the
likelihood that the change might deter future charitable giving.24
Current law’s structure to unearth a donor’s unexpressed intent unnecessarily concedes too much control to the static “dead hand” of the
past.25 The law already offers the wealthy many incentives to give, including allowing a living donor the option of enforcing his or her gift
through life, restricting the purpose of the gift until it becomes impracticable, and exempting charitable gifts from taxes.26 Absent an express
provision in a trust that accounts for changed conditions, trustees should
be allowed to propose reasonable modifications, enabling those entrusted to manage gifts to prioritize the charity over the donor’s legacy.
Through an analysis of the cy pres doctrine and an examination of recent case law, this article identifies several suggested factors that courts
(2009) (discussing “how to ameliorate the force of restrictions imposed by donors on
large gifts in the face of societal change”); see generally Jonathan Klick & Robert H.
Sitkoff, Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, and Corporate Control: Evidence from Hershey’s
Kiss-Off, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (2008) (explaining how the attorney general’s intervention ultimately harmed the Hershey Trust and decreased the value of the trust).
23 See Atkinson, supra note 6, at 1115 (“[T]he degree of frustration must be relatively great, the donor must have at least implicitly assented to the change, and the degree of change must be relatively small.”).
24 See infra Part IV.
25 See generally Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the
Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1 (1992) (discussing the various types of restrictions that decedents can place on gifts and the various problems encountered with each of them).
26 See generally Shannon Weeks McCormack, Taking the Good with the Bad: Recognizing the Negative Externalities Created by Charities and Their Implications for the Charitable Deduction, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 977 (2010) (discussing whether and to what extent
donors should be eligible for tax deductions on charitable donations).
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could use to determine the reasonableness of a proposed cy pres modification, thereby ending the search for the settlor’s intent once his or her
original purpose becomes unfeasible.
II. OVERVIEW

CY PRES AND THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
MODIFY CHARITABLE GIFTS

OF

TO

Courts use the common law doctrine of cy pres to modify a trust if
its designated charitable purpose becomes impracticable.27 Thus, when
a trust term prevents the effectuation of the trust’s purpose, cy pres
“repurposes” the trust to serve a related practical purpose.28
A. Common Law Cy Pres and Perpetual Dead Hand Control
Cy pres allows a court to modify the purpose of a charitable trust.29
Courts invoke cy pres when a charitable trust becomes illegal, impractical, impossible, or under some state statutes, wasteful.30 The doctrine
enables courts to reconcile the “inability of charitable settlors to foresee
the future” with the settlor’s ability to make a conditional gift in
perpetuity.31 Courts apply cy pres when the settlor failed to provide for
an alternative beneficiary via a gift-over clause, which would normally
redistribute the funds if the charitable purpose fails.32 Therefore, if a
donor fails to provide an alternative beneficiary, courts apply cy pres to
“preserve[ ] the settlor’s charitable intent by conforming the trust to
contingencies that arise.”33
Under the common law rule, trustees or the attorney general can
request a cy pres modification to alter the purpose of a trust believed to
be impracticable or unreasonable if the moving party proves that the
settlor manifested general charitable intent when he or she made the
original gift.34 The Restatement (Second) of Trusts provides a clear
summary of the original cy pres doctrine, which requires the court to
27

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. a. (2003).
Cy pres is distinguishable from the doctrine of equitable deviation, which authorizes courts to change the administrative terms of a trust when terms frustrate its otherwise valid purpose. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 cmt. subsec. (1).
29 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 28 cmt. a, 67 cmt. a.
30 See id. §§ 28 cmt. a, 67 cmt. a; UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413 (2010); In re Elizabeth
J.K.L. Lucas Charitable Gift (In re Lucas), 261 P.3d 800, 806 (Haw. Ct. App. 2011).
31 See In re Lucas, 261 P.3d at 806.
32 See id. at 810-11. The court, however, also notes that when the gift over clause
bequeaths to an equally impracticable or impossible purpose, cy pres will apply to the
original bequest. Id.
33 Id. at 807.
34 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 cmt. a (1959) (explaining cy pres);
see also In re Lucas, 261 P.3d at 807 (noting that courts do not require proof of literal
impossibility).
28
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examine extrinsic evidence to determine whether the “settlor manifested a more general charitable intention to devote his property to
charitable purposes.”35 If the court found general charitable intent, it
could “direct the application of the property to some charitable purpose
which falls within the general charitable intention of the settlor.”36 If
the court found no general charitable intent, the trust would fail and the
corpus would revert to the settlor’s estate.37
A charitable purpose becomes impracticable when “literal compliance would ‘defeat or substantially impair’ the purposes of the trust.”38
In order to prove the testator possessed general charitable intent, the
court must find that the gift “encompassed ‘something beyond the specific terms used in designating the beneficiary or purpose of the gift’. . .
as opposed to a narrow intent to benefit only a ‘particular project, objective, or institution.’”39 Courts invoking common law cy pres determine
whether the settlor possessed “something beyond” the specific purpose
of the gift by examining the language used in the instrument, the nature
and duration of the gift, the type of charitable organization, the presence or absence of a reversionary clause, the mode of gift effectuation,
and extrinsic evidence about the settlor’s intent.40
The comments to the Restatement (Second) explain that once the
court found the presence of general charitable intent, the court was not
limited to that remedy which is “as nearly as possible like that designated by the terms of the gift.”41 Instead, the court could approve a
modification that directed assets to a “different charitable purpose”
within the scope of the settlor’s “general charitable intent.”42 Thus,
charitable trusts that became impractical would fail unless a court found
that the settlor “manifested” a true charitable intent; but once a court
found the necessary intent, it could modify the trust in a manner consistent with the original gift.43
Throughout the twentieth century, legal scholars criticized as speculative the requirement that a judge inquire into whether a settlor possessed general charitable intent before a court could invoke cy pres.44
35

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399.
Id.
37 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. b (2003).
38 In re Elizabeth J.K.L. Lucas Charitable Gift (In re Lucas), 261 P.3d 800, 807
(Haw. Ct. App. 2011) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 cmt. a (1959)).
39 Id. at 808 (citations omitted).
40 See id. at 808, 813.
41 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 cmt. b. (1959).
42 Id. § 399 cmt. a.
43 Id. § 399.
44 See Melanie B. Leslie, Time to Sever the Dead Hand: Fisk University and the Cost
of the Cy Pres Doctrine, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 16-17 (2012) (supporting a
36

414

ACTEC LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40:407

Today, courts rarely allow a charitable trust to fail outright based on a
finding that the settlor lacked general charitable intent.45 Instead,
courts employ a modified version of cy pres that presumes a settlor’s
general charitable intent, softening the rules to prevent a failure of the
gift but still requiring the modification to be within the scope of the
settlor’s subjective charitable intent.46 Courts determine the appropriate modification by gathering evidence submitted by interested parties
who claim to identify the new purpose that is as near to the settlor’s
original intent as possible.47 Today, many jurisdictions apply the cy pres
doctrine outlined in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, which provides,
Unless the terms of the trust provide otherwise, where
property is placed in trust to be applied to a designated charitable purpose and it is or becomes unlawful, impossible, or impracticable to carry out that purpose, or to the extent it is or
becomes wasteful to apply all of the property to the designated
purpose, the charitable trust will not fail but the court will direct application of the property or appropriate portion thereof
to a charitable purpose that reasonably approximates the designated purpose.48
The comments to the Restatement (Third) explain that the doctrine enables courts to reconcile the perpetual duration of charitable trusts with
the reality that certain purposes become “obsolete as the needs and circumstances of society evolve over time.”49 This approach serves to enable a court to prevent the trust’s failure but still requires it to fashion a
remedy “consider[ing] evidence suggesting what the wishes of the settlor
probably would have been if the circumstances had been anticipated.”50
The court determines the settlor’s wishes with the same extrinsic evidence previously used to determine general charitable intent to determine if the modification is as near as possible to the original purpose of
the gift.51
fixed expiration date on dead hand control); Eric G. Pearson, Reforming the Reform of
the Cy Pres Doctrine: A Proposal to Protect Testator Intent, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 127, 148
(2006) (calling for more narrow powers on the courts to limit the redistribution of trust
assets in situations of “wastefulness”); see Atkinson, supra note 6, at 1113 (discussing the
fact that cy pres is “insufficiently attuned to societal needs”).
45 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. b (2003).
46 See id. § 67 cmt. d.
47 See id.
48 Id. § 67 (emphasis added).
49 Id. § 67 cmt. a.
50 Id. § 67 cmt. d.
51 See supra text accompanying note 48.
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B. Cy Pres Under the Uniform Trust Code
The UTC approach attempts to streamline the judicial doctrine of
cy pres by authorizing any living settlor to challenge the administration
of the trust.52 When the settlor is deceased, the UTC avoids the muddled business of determining general charitable intent by removing an
important obstacle to avoiding trust failure: under the UTC an instrument without express language to the contrary creates a rebuttable presumption of the settlor’s general charitable intent.53 However, the
UTC, like the Restatement (Third), requires the court to select the
modification most “consistent with the settlor’s charitable intent.”54
Thus, the UTC’s codification did not eliminate the need for courts to
engage in a subjective inquiry into the donor’s intent.
C. Applying Cy Pres: Courts Still Rely on Specific Donor Intent
While the UTC helps ensure cy pres will save charitable trusts by
preventing reversion, the actual application of cy pres still focuses on
speculation because courts must weigh the available extrinsic evidence
and find an appropriate modification that is consistent with the settlor’s
charitable intent.55 The modern rule spurs less litigation about the charitable trust’s validity but does not prevent disputes that arise as to what
“the settlor’s wishes would have been had he or she anticipated the
circumstances.”56
52 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 405(c) (2010) (“[T]he settlor of a charitable trust,
among others, may maintain a proceeding to enforce the trust . . . .”); see generally Ronald Chester, Grantor Standing to Enforce Charitable Transfers under Section 405(c) of the
Uniform Trust Code and Related Law: How Important Is It and How Extensive Should It
Be?, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 611 (2003) (arguing standing should extend to successors in interest in lieu of the attorney general). The Restatement (Third) of Trusts
follows a similar approach. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 94(2) (2012) (indicating that standing extends to “a person who has a special interest in the enforcement of
the trust.”).
53 See In re Elizabeth J.K.L. Lucas Charitable Gift (In re Lucas), 261 P.3d 800, 808
(Haw. Ct. App. 2011). Under the UTC, “the court may apply cy pres to modify or terminate the trust by directing that the trust property be applied or distributed, in whole or in
part, in a manner consistent with the settlor’s charitable purposes.” See UNIF. TRUST
CODE § 413(a)(3); see also OR. REV. STAT. § 130.210(1)(c) (2014) (“The court may apply
cy pres to modify or terminate the trust by directing that the trust property be applied or
distributed, in whole or in part, in a manner consistent with the settlor’s charitable
purposes.”).
54 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413 cmt. (emphasis added) (“[If] the particular purpose
for which the trust was created becomes impracticable, unlawful, impossible to achieve,
or wasteful, the trust does not fail. The court must . . . modify the terms of the trust . . . in
a manner consistent with the settlor’s charitable purposes.”).
55 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413 cmt.
56 In re Lucas, 261 P.3d at 809.
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Courts use the trust instrument as well as extrinsic evidence to decipher the settlor’s probable intent in order to come up with an adequate
modification.57 Interested parties – such as the attorney general, settlor’s heirs, and the trustee – can all propose modifications that purport
to align with the settlor’s specific charitable intent.58 In weighing conflicting proposals, a court focuses on the settlor’s intent even if the proposed modification adversely affects the charity’s ability to leverage or
administer the trust efficiently under the new terms.59 Cases discussed
in Part III.C, infra, demonstrate why courts should abandon the search
for the settlor’s subjective intent before approving a modification under
cy pres.60 The UTC’s revision did not eliminate the costly litigation that
arises from the doctrine’s focus upon a subjective inquiry because the
modern cy pres doctrine only quickly resolves impracticability issues if
all interested parties agree on any proposed modifications. If any party
disputes the changes proposed by the trustee (and the charity), invoking
cy pres could still result in costly and unpredictable litigation that wastes
charitable dollars and may deter the trustee from seeking modification
in the first place.61
III. EXAMINING

CASE LAW: THE LEGAL FICTION
SPECIFIC INTENT

THE
OF

A. Entities Can Easily Invoke Cy Pres with the Support of the
Donor’s Heirs
Heirs of the donor often offer testimony to identify and define the
donor’s subjective intent. For example, in In re Elizabeth J.K.L Lucas
Charitable Gift, Lucas bequeathed land to the Hawaiian Human Society
(HHS) that turned out to be unsuitable for a public park or educational
center as the will directed.62 After HHS spent extensive time and
money surveying the donated land, the trustee, HHS, and the decedent’s
heirs thought the best remedy would be for HSS to sell its interest in the
land and use the funds to build an educational center at an alternative
location.63 Despite the agreement of all parties regarding the use of the
57

See id.
See Lopez, supra note 12, at 1350 (noting interested parties include alternative
beneficiaries).
59 See, e.g., In re Fisk Univ., 392 S.W.3d 582, 590-93 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011).
60 See infra Part III.C.
61 See infra Part III.
62 See In re Elizabeth J.K.L. Lucas Charitable Gift (In re Lucas), 261 P.3d 800, 803
(Haw. Ct. App. 2011).
63 See id. at 807.
58
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funds, the probate court rejected the cy pres proposal as outside the
scope of the settlor’s specific intent.64
The Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the decision, and approved the original proposal of all the parties after a lengthy discussion
of the doctrine of cy pres.65 The court’s decision relied heavily on testimony from the decedent’s daughter regarding the fact that the proposed
solution “accomplishes her probable wishes” and otherwise “effectuates” the settlor’s charitable intent.66 In this situation, despite the family’s support of HHS’s reasonable solution, the probate court still denied
the HHS any remedy under cy pres that would have forced the charity
to forgo use of the land entirely.67 The court’s inquiry focused entirely
on whether the decedent would have approved the modification rather
than on what made the most sense given the unanticipated circumstances that arose from the gift of the land.68
B. Specific Intent Requires Courts to Impose Unnecessarily Narrow
Restraints
Courts often unnecessarily burden the recipient of a charitable bequest by applying cy pres narrowly. In In re Estate of Panthea M. Hopkins, a church wanted to sell land bequeathed to it by a former patron.69
In 1899, Ms. Hopkins bequeathed her homestead to her church “to be
used for and occupied as a parsonage” to house the church’s pastor.70
The church wished to adopt the more recent trend of providing a housing stipend to support the pastor and requested a cy pres modification
that would enable it to sell the land and place the funds in its general
expense account.71 The court granted the request to sell the home, but
required the church to keep the funds in a separate trust “to provide a
parsonage for the pastor” because the settlor’s intent did not encompass
a general gift to the church.72 The court concluded that the donor’s
“clearly expressed intent” required the church to use the proceeds from
the sale only to provide a housing stipend to the pastor.73 Therefore,
the court rejected the church’s contention that a separate trust account
64

See id. at 805.
See id. at 806-14.
66 See id. at 813-14.
67 See id. at 805.
68 See id. at 805, 813-14.
69 Opinion of the Connecticut Probate Court: In re Estate of Panthea M. Hopkins, 26
QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 234, 236 (2013).
70 Id.
71 See id. at 236 n.2.
72 See id. at 236-37.
73 See id. at 238.
65
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would result in waste and place an undue burden on the church.74 The
court recognized the need for a modification – but only if the church
segregated the funds – because it did not find evidence that Ms. Hopkins possessed any specific intent to support the church or its patrons
more broadly.75
The court imposed similarly narrow revisions in Estate of Buck.76
In 1975, Beryl H. Buck bequeathed seven million dollars in stock to
support her former community in Marin County.77 However, shortly
after her death, the stock in the trust unexpectedly increased in value to
over $260 million by 1980, $560 million by the 1990s, and is now valued
at nearly one billion dollars.78 In the early 1990s, the trustee filed an
action to invoke cy pres in order to expand the geographic reach of the
trust because the available funds far exceeded any practical needs within
the wealthy county.79 However, the attorney general and several local
charities intervened, arguing that the trust instrument explicitly restricted the funds to Marin County, and that allowing funds to leave the
county violated Buck’s specific intent.80
In the end, the parties settled and agreed to a court-ordered modification that authorized funding for any charity operating in Marin
County, even if the charity served people and organizations outside
county lines.81 To avoid litigation, the trustee agreed to a more narrow
modification in line with the challengers’ “specific donative intent” argument that did not enable the trustee to spend down the funds in a way
that would benefit a greater proportion of the public and nearby counties.82 Today, the billion-dollar trust corpus continues to grow, illustrating the ramifications of a narrowly applied cy pres remedy focused
solely upon a supposed fidelity to the donor’s specific intent.83 Further,
imposing a restriction limited to supporting charities operating in Marin
County was no more reasonable than simply expanding the geographic
reach of the trust, given that the approved modification authorized ben74

See id. at 239.
See id. at 238-39.
76 Estate of Buck v. Marin Cmty. Found., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 442 (Ct. App. 1994).
77 Richard Halstead, Buck Trust Beginnings, MARIN INDEP. J., http://www.marinij
.com/general-news/20071201/buck-trust-beginnings (last updated Dec. 12, 2007).
78 See Estate of Buck, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 443; Halstead, supra note 77.
79 See Estate of Buck, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 443.
80 See id.
81 See id. at 444.
82 Id.
83 See Peter Fimrite, S.F. Supervisors Lack Faith In Trust/Buck Fund Attacked for
Restricting Aid to Poor in Marin, S.F. GATE (Mar. 2, 2002, 4:00 AM), http://
www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/S-F-supervisors-lack-faith-in-trust-Buck-fund-2866958
.php.
75
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eficiaries to serve populations outside Marin County.84 This narrowly
tailored revision is contrary to the public policy behind perpetual charitable gifts, especially since no one truly knows what Buck would have
done if she had known about this turn of events.85 Further, the length
and cost of the litigation stemming from attempts to modify the trust
have likely deterred the Buck trustee from a second attempt to modify
the purpose of the gift.
C. Costly Litigation Ensues When Interested Parties Intervene in
Cy Pres Proceedings Alleging a Contrary Charitable Intent
1. Fisk University and the Alfred Stieglitz Collection
In In re Fisk University, the Tennessee Court of Appeals approved
a cy pres modification of Georgia O’Keeffe’s bequest of over one hundred paintings to Fisk University, most by way of the estate of her late
husband, Alfred Stieglitz.86 In the 1950s, O’Keeffe donated part of
Stieglitz’s art collection to Fisk, a historically black college located in the
South, because she believed such a gift would promote racial integration
by creating a space where blacks and whites could gather and discuss art
in the then-segregated South.87 The court found O’Keeffe’s decision to
“plac[e] the art at Fisk was a strong social statement and integral to
[her] general intent to expose Nashville and the South to the [modern]
art.”88
In the early 2000s, Fisk encountered financial problems that made it
difficult to comply with the trust instrument’s display and maintenance
requirements for the collection, so Fisk sought a remedy under cy pres,
hoping to modify the instrument in a way that enabled it to maintain its
interest in the collection, valued at over sixty million dollars.89 Fisk
showed that compliance with the trust instrument cost it $131,000 per
year and that maintaining the gift was impracticable because it required
Fisk to substantially reduce funding for its other programs.90 Rather
84

See id.
See Susan Gary, The Problems with Donor Intent: Interpretation, Enforcement,
and Doing the Right Thing, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV., 977, 988 (2010) (“Determining donor
intent on these facts seems impossible . . . ; describing the court’s decision as one made in
conformity with donor intent seems inapposite.”).
86 See Georgia O’Keeffe Found. v. Fisk Univ., 312 S.W.3d 1, 4, 20 (Tenn Ct. App.
2009); see also Leslie, supra note 44, at 1-15 (providing a detailed overview and history of
the Fisk litigation).
87 See In re Fisk Univ. 392 S.W.3d 582, 589-90 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011); see also Fisk
University History, FISK UNIV., http://www.fisk.edu/about/history (last visited Sept. 15,
2015).
88 In re Fisk Univ., 392 S.W.3d at 590.
89 See Georgia O’Keeffe Found., 312 S.W.3d at 4.
90 In re Fisk Univ., 392 S.W.3d at 588.
85
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than adopting a solution proposed by Fisk or a reasonable alternative,
the lower court followed cy pres law and determined the appropriate
remedy by “solicit[ing] proposals” from all interested parties to discern
a solution that closely mirrored O’Keeffe’s subjective intent for the
gift.91 After years of litigation over what O’Keeffe would have wanted,
the trial court controversially adopted Fisk’s original proposal, which
authorized a partial sale of its interest in the collection that enabled the
univeristy to maintain some ownership interest in the collection and remain operational as a university.92
The court’s cy pres remedy allowed Fisk to negotiate a partial sale
of its interest to a local museum that would share display rights with
Fisk despite express terms in the trust instrument prohibiting Fisk from
selling any part of the collection.93 The court reasoned that Fisk’s proposal “closely approximated Ms. O’Keeffe’s intent” that residents of the
South retain access to the paintings, and none of the evidence “specifically address[ed]” how Fisk could use the collection “in conjunction
with” its “educational program.”94 Thus, the appellate court granted
Fisk unrestricted use of the funds received from the partial sale despite
the lower court’s order that most of the funds be placed in a separate
endowment to support the O’Keeffe collection.95 It seems the appellate
court used the speculative nature of specific intent to fashion a remedy
it found most helpful to the recipient of the original gift, Fisk.
The dissent aptly pointed out that under cy pres the “trial court is to
fashion a form of relief that most closely approximates Ms. O’Keeffe’s
charitable intent,” and that the court possessed the discretion to modify
any proposal submitted for review before adopting it.96 Thus, under the
traditional rules the court could not use cy pres to “promote what the
court views as a worthy charitable agenda.”97 The dissent argued that
the record did not contain any evidence of a charitable intent to “fund
the general operations of Fisk,” and that any proceeds from the sale
should fund general operations only to prevent Fisk from “closing its
doors.”98 Further, the dissent pointed out that Fisk would only need
more funds in the future because the cost of maintaining the collection
would only increase over time.99 The dissent concluded that cy pres re91

Id. at 590.
See id. at 586.
93 See id. at 584.
94 See id. at 591, 595.
95 See id. at 597.
96 Id. at 600 (Clement, J., dissenting).
97 See id. (quoting Bd. of Trs. of Museum of Am. Indian, Heye Found. v. Bd. of Trs.
of Huntington Free Library & Reading Room, 610 N.Y.S.2d 488, 499 (App. Div. 1994)).
98 See id. at 601.
99 See id.
92
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quires fidelity to the donor’s wishes because his or her specific intent
encourages future charitable gifts, even though some “dispositions [are]
imperfectly suited for the achievement of their purposes.”100
The dissent claimed that the majority artificially found that Fisk’s
proposal aligned with O’Keeffe’s specific intent to help Fisk leverage its
interest in the gift to escape a financial bind.101 The dissent argued that
cy pres’ “as near as possible” constraint required a more limited modification that focused less upon the needs of the beneficiary.102 The dissenting judge argued that, despite an earlier finding of “general
charitable intent” on the part of Ms. O’Keeffe, the law required a remedy tailored to O’Keeffe’s specific intent, not one that benefited Fisk.103
Thus, the dissent argued that O’Keeffe’s specific intent required all the
funds Fisk received from the sale to be set aside in trust to be used only
to maintain its interest in the collection, to be reserved in case Fisk encountered future problems that again caused it to be “imperfectly
suited” to maintain control over the collection.104
In reality, the majority in Fisk did defy the principles of cy pres to
fashion a reasonable remedy that benefitted the University – but it did
so under the legal fiction that the holding mirrored O’Keeffe’s charitable intent despite the gift instrument barring any sale.105 Fisk did not
need a large endowment in order to properly maintain and preserve its
interest in the collection, but the proceeds would greatly benefit the
campus, a purpose that was at best tangential to O’Keeffe’s specific intent to make the gift – an openly expressed desire to create a diverse
public forum that supported desegregation.106 Instead, this result, as the
dissent pointed out, did not conform to the requirements of cy pres, but
did afford the donee with a reasonable solution that allowed it to retain
its interest in the bequest as intended by O’Keeffe while also providing
additional benefits to the public and the University.107 Thus, if the law
authorized the court to simply adopt a trustee’s reasonable proposal, the
court would not have had to solicit proposals from outsiders, nor tailor a
decision that puts forth the legal fiction that Fisk’s proposal actually reflected O’Keeffe’s specific intent.
100 See id. at 602 (quoting Bd. of Trustees of Museum of Am. Indian, Heye Found.,
610 N.Y.S.2d at 501).
101 See id. at 600 (“[T]he trial court fashioned relief it believed to closely resemble
Ms. O’Keeffe’s general intent.”).
102 See id.
103 See id. at 600.
104 See id. at 602.
105 See id. at 593.
106 See id. at 589-90.
107 See id at 602.
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2. Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School
During the Cold War in 1961, Marie Robertson made a charitable
gift of stock to Princeton University to establish the Woodrow Wilson
School, a graduate school devoted to training men and women for careers in public service.108 The stated purpose of the charitable gift was
to foster education “to strengthen the Government of the United States
and increase its ability and determination to defend and extend freedom
throughout the world.”109 Mrs. Robertson and Princeton negotiated the
terms of her inter vivos gift over several months, eventually agreeing to
a gift instrument designed to protect each of their interests: Princeton
maintained control over the foundation to ensure it could develop and
manage the school, and Robertson received the right to appoint a minority of the Foundation’s board members.110
In 2002, Robertson’s heirs sought to dissolve the Foundation under
the doctrine of cy pres.111 The heirs claimed that Princeton was incapable of carrying out the specific intent of generating public servants, and
the court should dissolve the Foundation because few Woodrow Wilson
School graduates actually pursued government jobs.112 Princeton countered that cy pres did not apply to charitable funds donated in the form
of foundations (rather than in the form of charitable trusts), and even if
it did, the gift called for a “multi-disciplinary” purpose beyond the limited scope of only educating students for government jobs.113 Princeton
claimed that Ms. Robertson intended for the Foundation to control the
charitable gift to ensure that the University could effectively manage the
expansion of the graduate program and rely on the funds for faculty
salaries and other expenditures.114 Princeton requested that the court
release the restrictions on the funds outright to the University.115
In 2008, after six years of litigation and tens of millions of dollars in
legal fees, the heirs settled with Princeton, recouping a small portion of
the original gift and releasing any claim to the remaining $800 million in
the trust outright to the University.116 Because of the settlement, the
108 See Robertson v. Princeton Univ., No. C-99-02, 2007 N.J. Super. LEXIS 3015, at
*3-4 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Oct. 25, 2007).
109 Id.
110 See id. at *4-5.
111 See id. at *2-3.
112 See id at *2-3, *27.
113 See id. at *27-28; see also Gary, supra note 85, at 983 (discussing Robertson).
114 See Robertson id. at *9-10 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Oct. 25, 2007); see also Gary,
supra note 85, at 983.
115 See Robertson, 2007 N.J. Super. LEXIS 3015 at *10.
116 Oliver Staley & Janet Frankston Lorin, Princeton Settles Lawsuit Over $900 Million Endowment (Update 3), BLOOMBERG (Dec. 10, 2008, 3:28 PM), http://www.bloom
berg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aMXdCghYl7Gw.
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court did not have to find whether cy pres could be used to alter the
purpose of the gift outside the trust context.117 However, this litigation
emphasizes the danger of focusing on the specific intent of a donor
whose life ended decades before litigation began. If the court would
have used cy pres to modify the trust, the heirs would have likely argued
that Robertson’s specific intent required the graduate program to train
individuals solely for government jobs and, absent that, the gift should
fail. This is because cy pres currently requires a court to consider these
arguments.118 In contrast, this litigation could have been avoided entirely if the court’s analysis focused only upon granting Princeton a reasonable modification because it would likely find that a reasonable
donor would not want the Woodrow Wilson School closed, nor would
they desire the gift to revert back to heirs otherwise provided for in
other testamentary intrustments.
3. Estate of Elkins v. Temple University Hospital
During his life, Mr. Elkins spent much of his time working for and
supporting the Hahnemann Hospital in downtown Philadelphia.119
Upon his death in 1919, he left two equal testamentary trusts to benefit
two different hospitals – one in Abington and another in downtown
Philadelphia.120 In the late 20th century, a for-profit entity acquired the
Hahnemann facility in Philadelphia and converted the hospital into a
medical education center and health clinic, causing the literal charitable
purpose of the trust – to benefit a hospital – to fail.121 Hahnemann’s
trustee petitioned the court to repurpose the trust and designate an appropriate beneficiary.122 The new facility in Philadelphia petitioned the
court to retain the funds as a cy pres beneficiary because, even though
the medical center was not techinically a modern day hostpial, it still
provided medical services to the same local community and otherwise
mirrored Elkin’s specific intent.123 The other beneficiary to the will, the
Abington hospital, also laid a claim to the funds, claiming Mr. Elkin’s
specific intent required the funds to benefit a hospital that served Philadelphia residents.124
After nine years of litigation, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania
determined that the Hahnemann medical center was the appropriate cy
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124

See Robertson, 2007 N.J. Super. LEXIS 3015, at *56-57.
Id. at 58-60.
See In re Estate of Elkins, 32 A.3d 768, 772 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011).
Id. at 771.
Id. at 771-72.
Id. at 771-73.
Id. at 773.
Id.
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pres beneficiary because “Elkins would have chosen [it] as the recipient
of his largesse had he been aware of the failure of Hahnemann Hospital’s charitable purpose.”125 The court found that if Elkins could have
predicted the advances in medical science, he “would have wished” for
the funds to remain in place and serve the same local population because the newly formed facility “performs a variety of functions that
were historically performed by hospitals.”126 The court thoroughly discussed advances in medical science to justify why it allowed the funds to
remain at the Hahnemann location based on Elkins’s intent, which it
found included funding an inter-city “hospital-like” facility.127 Thus,
like the court in Fisk, the Elkins court proclaimed to rely upon detailed
evidence as to why Elkins would approve the original beneficiary’s proposal, rather than the reasonableness of the proposal offered by the intervening party – whose interpretation was directly supported by the
language in the instrument.128
A. The Forced Reliance on the Dead Hand May Prevent the
Charitable Trusts from Affording Any Public Benefit
Courts adhering to cy pres strictly construe the donor’s specific intent when considering what modifications to approve. In In re Trust of
Lowry, the Ohio Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s application of cy pres to redirect some of the funds in a charitable trust created
“for the beautification and upkeep” of three cemeteries within the
city.129 The trust contained over seventy-five thousand dollars in funds
and the actual expenditures against the trust over the past thirty-five
years did not exceed a total of twenty thousand dollars.130 The lower
court ordered the trust assets reduced to twenty-five thousand dollars
and created a second trust with the excess funds to be used for “capital
expenditures to the three cemeteries” or “other capital improvements”
for the township.131 The appellate court reversed, even though the Ohio
legislature had adopted the UTC, finding that the lower court “misapplied the phrase ‘general charitable intent,’” and that cy pres will not
allow any “modification of the trust . . . for a purpose too dissimilar to
Lowry’s original intent.”132 The court found that the settlor’s aim to
provide for “upkeep and beautification” did not include “capital ex125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132

Id. at 774.
Id. at 778.
Id.
See id. at 778-81.
See In re Trust of Lowry, 885 N.E.2d 296, 301-02 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008).
See id.
See id. at 296.
See id. at 301.
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penditures” and that future circumstances might require greater “beautification” expenditures.133 The Lowry court rejected any expanded use
of the trust funds for alternative purposes because it was possible that
someday the funds might be needed for the original narrow beautification purpose the settlor specifically outlined in the original
instrument.134
Similarly, in In re R.B. Plummer Memorial Loan Fund Trust v. Nebraska, the University of Nebraska requested cy pres modification of
two charitable trusts claiming that the funds were being wasted under
their current limited purpose.135 The University was the holder of two
trust funds that dated back to 1947 and 1967, respectively. These trusts
authorized the University to issue educational loans to students.136 In
its petition for cy pres modification, the University argued that it should
be able to convert the corpus into scholarship funds because the modern
day federal loan programs and the overall cost of education made the
trust fund loans a much less desirable source of funding. The University
highlighted the lack of interest in the loan model by showing that students borrowed a meager ten to fifteen thousand dollars from the funds
annually, despite income balances exceeding $250,000.137
Despite a showing that the funds would continue to go underutilized, the court rejected the University’s request to invoke cy pres, finding that the University could do more to market the loans to students or
offer students more competitive rates, and therefore the University did
not sufficiently prove the trust’s purpose was wasteful.138 The court
found that the loan restriction was “a narrow specific purpose” and that
“changes in the financial aid arena,” including the existence of federal
loans alone, did not justify changing the instrument, even if “greater
social good [could] be accomplished by using these funds for direct
grants.”139 To prove it qualifies for cy pres relief in line with the donor
intent, the University must first devote time and resources into marketing the current fund, even though the federal government already provides students with competitive loans based on need.140 In reality, it is
unreasonable to think the University will devote any additional resources to utilize these funds and instead will simply continue to underu133

See id. at 301-02.
See id. at 302.
135 In re R.B. Plummer Mem’l Loan Fund Trust v. Nebraska, 661 N.W.2d 307, 309
(Neb. 2003).
136 See id.
137 See id. at 310.
138 See id. at 312.
139 See id. (quoting In re Estate of Berry, 139 N.W.2d 72, 78 (Wis. 1966)).
140 See id.
134
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tilize the trust funds because proving impracticability is itself
impracticable.
IV. A FACTOR TEST: ESTABLISHING A REASONABLE DONOR
STANDARD FOR CHARITABLE TRUST MODIFICATION
Courts created the doctrine of cy pres as a trust-saving measure designed to prevent charitable trusts from failing because of changes that
prevent the original purpose of the trust from being realized.141 Thus,
beneficiaries cannot invoke the doctrine of cy pres unless they first
prove that the original purpose has become impracticable, impossible,
or in some jurisdictions, wasteful.142 The doctrine ensures that entities
cannot modify a trust’s purpose unless the unpredictable occurs: the
original charitable purpose becomes outmoded or impractical.143 Settlors can attempt to avoid issues of impracticality at the planning stages,
if they wish, by providing alternative beneficiaries or purposes for the
funds in the event the original purpose fails. When a trustee seeks cy
pres relief, the donor is often deceased and cannot consent to the
changes proposed by the trustee.144 Yet, courts and legislatures continue to focus on the settlor’s specific intent at the time the gift was
made.145
Courts often either strictly construe cy pres and rarely grant requested modifications even when doing so could promote enormous
public good, or they may bend the doctrine of cy pres to deduce whether
the testator’s specific intent supports the trustee’s proposed changes.146
Currently, UTC jurisdictions already have loosened the requirements
for cy pres by creating a rebuttable presumption of general charitable
intent on behalf of the settlor, but courts in UTC jurisdictions still require the moving party to show that the selected modification conforms
to the settlor’s subjective intent.147 Instead, the law should authorize
141

See generally RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER
AMERICAN DEAD (2010) (arguing that the dead hand of the past often interferes
with legitimate charitable intentions, posing a large cost to society and, ultimately, the
donor as well).
142 See supra Part II.A.
143 See supra Part II.A.
144 See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 10, at 2244-46 (discussing scholarly arguments in
favor of limiting dead-hand control stemming from changed circumstances and the inability to communicate with the donor).
145 John K. Eason, Motive, Duty, and the Management of Restricted Charitable Gifts,
45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123, 177 (2010) (advocating for an analysis that asks, “[W]hy
did the donor impose the restriction?” and applying an objective approach to reform
after determining the donor’s specific purpose); see supra Part II.A.
146 See supra Part III.B.
147 See supra Part II.B.
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the court to rely on the presumption of general charitable intent and
eliminate the legal fiction of specific intent from all stages of cy pres
modification.148
The legal remedy to lessen the harmful effects of perpetual deadhand control does not require a massive legal reform or intentional circumvention of the legal process, nor should it grant complete power to
the trustee.149 Instead, courts could look to the public benefit of the
charitable gift and first examine the trustee’s proposed modification –
rather than those of interveners – balanced against the actual reason
courts enforce specific intent, namely, the likelihood that the modification might deter future reasonable donors from making donations.150
Through an examination of the cases discussed supra in Part III, legislatures could extract several factors that would enable courts to openly
and directly modify charitable gifts under cy pres without delving into
speculative extrinsic evidence regarding the specific intent of the longdeceased donor.
A. First Factor: Does Modification Increase the Public Benefit?
Courts have rejected proposals under cy pres despite recognizing
that a great public benefit could result from the proposed change.
Often, courts grant cy pres relief but adopt narrow modifications or outright reject a change because it is not narrowly tailored to the donor’s
specific intent, even though the approved change might be more wasteful or less practicable. In In re R.B. Plummer Memorial Loan Fund
Trust v. Nebraska, the court refused the trustee’s request to alter the
purpose of the trust despite evidence that alternative fund sources made
the loans less desirable to students and instead forced the University
either to expend additional resources to advertise the loans or simply
continue to underutilize the funds.151 Similarly, Estate of Buck illustrates the major problem stemming from the focus on the subjective intent of the donor rather than how the public will benefit from a
modification.152 In Buck, the court rejected the trustee’s initial proposal
to expand the geographic reach of the trust to help spend down its as148 See Hirsch, supra note 10, at 2250 (“[A] mandatory power of modification should
come into effect only after [sufficient] time has elapsed.”).
149 Cf. Rob Atkinson, The Low Road to Cy Pres Reform: Principled Practice to Remove Dead Hand Control of Charitable Assets, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 97, 101 (2007)
(discussing the “glacial[ ]” pace at which legislatures and courts have moved, and advocating for methods that side-step courts and the legislature); Atkinson, supra note 6, at
1140-41 (advocating the removal of judicial discretion).
150 See Gary, supra note 85, at 1002, 1007.
151 See supra Part III.D.
152 See supra Part III.B.
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sets.153 Instead, the court approved a settlement proposal submitted by
interveners that better mirrored the subjective intent of the donor by
keeping all funds within Marin County even though the geographic restriction on the instrument was the main reason the trustee requested
modification in the first place.154 To date, the Buck trust remains substantially overfunded despite the genuine need of charities operating
just outside Marin County. Currently, courts cannot consider the public
benefit of a trust modification, despite a finding that the gift has become
impracticable, because the approved proposal must closely align with
what the court deems is the settlor’s specific intent.155 Instead, courts
should be allowed to approve a modification when the change accounts
for the public benefit of the modification rather than when it mirrors the
frustrated subjective intent of the deceased donor.
B. Second Factor: Elapsed Time and Cultural Changes Since the
Donation
Charitable needs evolve over time, and thus, the more time that has
elapsed since the date of the gift, the less relevant the narrow purpose of
the gift becomes. Again, because cy pres already requires a finding of
impossibility or impracticability, the original purpose of the gift has already been found to be partially obsolete. This is particularly true in the
case of legacy gifts such as those given to Princeton, as well as Fisk’s gift
designed to encourage desegregation of cultural spaces.156
In all the cases discussed supra in Part III, the courts failed to fully
consider changed circumstances, even though the donor did not predict
or consider the reasons why the trustee requested a cy pres modification
in the first place. The only case considered herein that truly accounted
for temporal changes was Estate of Elkins, where the court discussed the
radical advances in medical science over the past century to cleverly
prove that the approved trust modification matched the settlor’s specific
intent for the funds to benefit a “hospital-like” facility in the downtown
153

See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.B.
155 In re Fisk Univ., 392 S.W.3d 582, 601-02 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011) (Clement, J., dissenting) (“[T]he entire $30 million to Fisk University to be used as it deems necessary,
albeit for a very worthy cause, cannot be justified under the restraints of cy pres. . . . The
record clearly reveals that Ms. O’Keeffe never intended for the Collection to be sold or
otherwise monetized . . . Ms. O’Keeffe’s stated intent was to expose the Collection to the
South by having it exhibited at Fisk University.”); see supra Part III.C.3 (discussing the
gift to Hahnemann Hospital).
156 See Georgia O’Keeffe Found. v. Fisk Univ., 312 S.W.3d 1, 21 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2009); Ben Gose, Princeton and Robertson Family Settle Donor-Intent Dispute, THE
CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY (Dec. 10, 2008), http://philanthropy.com/article/Princeton
Robertson-Family/62967/.
154
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Philadelphia area.157 Instead of years of litigation, under the proposed
reasonable donor standard, the court could have simply approved the
trustee’s proposal because the requested modification was reasonable
given that the funds would still support the general charitable purpose
of providing medical services to the same community. Under an objective reasonable settlor approach, courts need not determine if the modification matches exactly the settlor’s subjective intent, thereby removing
the need for hearings on extrinsic evidence as well as litigation over
which proposal most accurately reflects the settlor’s specific intent.
C. Third Factor: The Administrative Burden of Alternative
Proposals
Focusing on donor intent also creates unnecessary burdens on trust
management because the “dead hand” often forces entities to adopt
inefficient changes under cy pres even though the original purpose
failed. The litigation stemming from O’Keeffe’s gift to Fisk, Buck’s
charitable trust for Marin, and Robertson’s donation to the Woodrow
Wilson School all illustrate this point because all involved litigation between the trustee, beneficiaries, and various interveners who claimed
the trustees’ proposed use or current use of trust funds violated the subjective intent of the settlor.158 In each case, the interveners sought to
narrow the use of the particular trust funds, claiming that the settlor’s
subjective intent was for only a limited purpose, whether it be to benefit
residents of Marin County, educate future government employees, or exclusively display paintings in one location despite astronomical costs.
The ability of interveners to litigate the issue of subjective intent rather
than relying on a more objective standard frustrates the purpose and
policy behind cy pres. An objective modification standard would eliminate years of litigation (which wastes trust assets) and would also allow
courts to abandon the lengthy and administratively difficult process of
identifying the modification most in line with the subjective intent of the
settlor – a process which often fails to offset the impracticability that
pushed the trustee to seek a remedy with the courts in the first place.
The dissent in Fisk argued that the funds for the collection should
have been restricted to a separate trust fund, just as the court required
in In re Estate of Panthea M. Hopkins.159 In these instances, both courts
relied on the settlor’s original purpose for the gift in determining what
157

See supra Part III.C.3.
See supra Part III.
159 See In re Fisk Univ., 392 S.W.3d at 602 (Clement, J., dissenting); see also Opinion
of the Connecticut Probate Court: In re Estate of Panthea M. Hopkins, 26 QUINNIPIAC
PROB. L.J. 234, 238 (2013).
158
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type of modification mirrored settlor intent.160 Here, both courts found
that cy pres applied but that adherence to settlor intent trumped administrative ease and required the trustees to maintain all charitable trusts
funds in a separate trust account, with a separate a trustee to manage
the funds, and incur additional costs each time they attempted to access
the funds.161
In re R.B. Plummer Memorial Loan Fund Trust v. Nebraska highlights a similar issue.162 In Plummer, the court denied the university cy
pres relief because it failed to exhaust all avenues available to achieve
the original charitable purpose of the gift, even though other sources
adequately performed their purpose.163 Instead, the court encouraged
the university to increase advertising of the loan service and to modify
the existing terms to compete with the federally provided loans even
though the trustee pointed out that modifying the terms too much might
violate a fiduciary duty.164
The law’s continued devotion to specific intent imposes wasteful
administrative burdens on beneficiaries and could be remedied if courts
were able to instead simply weigh reasonableness of the beneficiary’s or
the trustee’s proposal to modify the limitations placed upon the original
gift. A reasonableness standard that does not require fidelity to “specific intent” would enable courts to select proposals that decrease,
rather than increase, the administrative burdens on the beneficiary that
is simply attempting to utilize a gift it has already been given.
D. Fourth Factor: Likelihood of Deterring Future Conditional Gifts
This factor focuses on two prongs: the foreseeability of the change
in circumstances and the impact the modification will have on overall
charitable giving. A reasonable donor would not desire his or her assets
to sit idly in trust simply because the cause he or she sought to support is
160 See In re Fisk Univ., 392 S.W.3d at 602; In re Estate of Panthea M. Hopkins, 26
QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 234, 238.
161 See In re Fisk Univ., 392 S.W.3d at 600; In re Estate of Panthea M. Hopkins, 26
QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 234, 236-37, 239.
162 See generally In re R.B. Plummer Mem’l Loan Fund Trust v. Nebraska, 661
N.W.2d 307, 312 (Neb. 2003).
163 See id. (quoting In re Estate of Berry, 139 N.W.2d 72, 78 (Wis. 1966)) (“There
may well be a greater need for scholarship funds than for loans. Perhaps greater social
good can be accomplished by using these funds for direct grants to students, but it is not
for this or any court to determine the relative wisdom of a bequest and to substitute its
judgment for that of the testator.”).
164 See id. at 313 (“The Foundation contends that the trusts’ purposes will not be
changed because they will be used first for loans and scholarships will be given only after
all loan funds are disbursed. But the record fails to show that all or more of the funds
cannot be used for loans.”).
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no longer viable or useful. Thus, when the needs for which funds are
donated disappear, courts should adopt proposals designed to use the
funds in reasonably related manners. Courts should first consider the
trustee’s proposed changes because charities have an additional incentive to remain loyal to the donor’s original purpose to ensure it continues to benefit from new donors.165 Further, the trustee possesses the
most knowledge regarding the original uses for the gift and can more
readily identify a reasonably related purpose for the funds.166
If a court first focuses on whether the trustee’s proposed modifications are reasonable, beneficiaries can avoid the dangers of the speculative inquiry triggered by a cy pres motion, and avoid the litigation that
arose in Buck, Fisk, and Robertson that often ensues from finding a proposal that most closely aligns with the settlor’s specific intent.167 Because the court need not adopt the most reasonable proposal, it can
focus first on the trustee’s request and test whether its proposed change
is reasonable in light of the considerations discussed above.
V. CONCLUSION
This article argues that when a court finds the existence of general
charitable intent sufficient for cy pres, the court’s analysis should aim for
objectively reasonable revisions, rather than focus on settlors’ supposed
subjective preferences. By limiting the court’s discretion to the consideration of factors aimed to determine reasonableness, trustees and
courts can work together to modify the purposes of outmoded trusts.
Thus, courts could approve a trustee’s proposal despite the fact that the
donor’s heirs or others with conflicts of interest may not support it as
sufficiently narrowly tailored to the specific intent of the settlor.168
This proposal seeks to increase the efficiency of charitable giving
without creating any perverse disincentives. Because cy pres cannot apply until an entity proves impracticability, the dead hand of the donor
remains in control until unforeseen circumstances arise.169 At that
point, the entity should be able to modify the gift by showing that the
proposed change will not deter future gifts and will in fact increase the
165 See Atkinson, supra note 6, at 1127 (discussing the reality that charities always
worry about the risks of “alienating future donors”); Gary, supra note 85, at 1036-38,
1042 (arguing that charities should leverage gift agreements that expressly allow beneficiaries to redirect the funds).
166 See Atkinson, supra note 6, at 1127.
167 See Lopez, supra note 12, at 1350 (“[C]hoosing between competing proposals can
be as costly as redistributing the charitable assets to the donor’s successors in interest.”).
168 Cf. Lee, supra note 17, at 199-200 (advocating for the adoption of a trustee’s
proposal if it is in line with the trust’s “broader purpose” rather than the narrowest
modification).
169 See Lee, supra note 17, at 176.
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public’s benefit from the assets.170 Thus, beneficiaries and trustees
could leverage cy pres without worrying about incentivized protests
from interested parties that might offer proposals more attuned to the
specific intent of the donor.
This reasonableness standard allows courts to consider factors that
today they must often veil in specific intent. The dead hand of the past
creates conflicting duties for charities that rely on charitable gifts but
also strive to serve the public good. Thus, a cy pres doctrine that focuses
on the current needs of the public enables donors to control the use of
their funds, but only until the designated purpose is served or unforeseen circumstances arise that trigger the trustee’s ability to suggest reasonable modifications that enable the trust to continue to offer the
public a benefit.

170 Cf. Atkinson, supra note 6, at 1120 (arguing that an objective intent focused
solely upon “efficiency” would enable the courts too much latitude and deter future
donations).

